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Democracy and Income Inequality: Measurement and Modeling  
of the Western Hemispheric Experience 
 
Abstract: What is our understanding of the relationship between democracy and income 
inequality in the Western Hemisphere? This paper specifies a nonlinear relationship 
between democracy and income inequality in multivariate non-linear models across 
different regions and time points of the Western Hemisphere as well as the hemisphere 
based on a common literature (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, Barro 1999, Boix 2003, 
Burkhart 1997, Houle 2009). While the literature has rigorously tested these relationships 
within Latin America (Huber et al. 2006), there has not been a similar test of all of the 
Western Hemispheric countries, including the industrialized economies of Canada and 
the United States.  This paper will utilize the best extant income inequality measure, the 
Solt (2009) corrections to the UNU-WIDER project.  This comparative exercise should 
be instructive in both a modeling sense and a better understanding of consequences of 
using income inequality measures across hemispheric subregions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 What is the relationship between democracy and income inequality in the Western 
Hemisphere?  While cross-national research on the topic of income inequality has 
become rather extensive (Ansell 2010, Houle 2009), and some regional work in Latin 
America has been published (Huber et al. 2006), extant work on the Western Hemisphere 
as a whole is rather sparse.  Reasons accounting for this lack of interest in a hemispheric 
perspective include the tendency to divide the hemisphere into distinct entities: North 
America, Central America, South America, Latin America, and the Caribbean.  These 
regions have their own separate identities, histories, and trajectories of political and 
economic development. 
 However, there is an appreciable connection between these sub-regions that also 
makes analysis of these areas as a whole be potentially fruitful.  From the days of the 
Monroe Doctrine, international interpretation of the region as an aggregate has on 
occasion made sense.  For instance, many of the nation-states in the Western Hemisphere 
belong to common international organizations such as the Organization of American 
States, and thus can have a common perspective on issues of interest to the hemisphere.  
Also, as the global recession hit the developed world hard, less well-expressed was the 
even greater ferocity with which the developing world felt the effects of the loss of about 
1/3 of the global wealth.  (It should be added that some countries were able to escape the 
most pernicious effects of the "Great Recession", including Canada, which experienced 
continuous economic growth during the 2007-2010 period.)   
 Thus, we have some cause to analyze the political and economic fortunes of the 
entire Western Hemisphere as a globalized whole.  My paper proposes just such a 
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preliminary effort at estimating a common model that seeks to explain variation in 
income inequality and democracy across countries.  The model has had some previous 
publication success (Burkhart 1997, Burkhart 2007), but has been estimated on data from 
countries around the world.  Whether or not the model will apply to the Western 
Hemisphere is in doubt, because there have been relatively common historical 
development features to the region, such as religious affiliation (Latin America's 
Catholicism), that could negate the impact of key control variables in the model. 
Scholarship on the causes and consequences of income inequality continues to 
advance.  The reasons for this momentum are several, but perhaps the most important 
ones are theoretical interest in the topic and technical improvements to the enterprise.  In 
particular, scholars have made notable efforts to clean and systematize the data, as well as 
create more sophisticated modeling approaches to produce more robust conclusions 
(Ansell 2010, Houle 2009).  The greatest improvements have come in the developing 
world, where two organized efforts have been particularly fruitful: the United Nations 
University WIDER dataset on inequality (2008), and Frederick Solt's standardization of 
the WIDER dataset in his Standardized World Income Inequality Database (2009). 
Cross-national work on income inequality and democracy has continued apace 
over the in recent years.  Better data and methods have spurred researchers toward more 
definitive findings.  The relationship between income inequality and democracy does 
seem more secure as the data advance into the 2000s decade.  The data support the 
specification of nonlinear models explaining variation in both income inequality and 
democracy.  And the results of those specifications allow for some optimism that a truer 
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reading is possible of a critical relationship in political economy: the distribution of 
income and the distribution of freedom. 
 This very brief paper attempts to advance the literature through a more focused 
comparison of economic and political distribution in the Western Hemisphere.  In 
addition, this paper also takes as a starting point recent work that specifies a nonlinear 
relationship between income inequality and democracy in multivariate models 
(Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, Burkhart 1997, Houle 2009), and shows how that 
nonlinear form translates across the Western Hemisphere.  The nonlinear specification 
goes against the grain of the majority of the literature, which has generally specified a 
linear relationship between inequality and democracy / democratization (Barro 1999, 
Boix 2003, Bollen and Jackman 1985).  Yet the more recent evidence suggests the 
nonlinear relationship, either in an inverted U-shaped curve or a more subtle logarithmic 
sloping, to be more representative and promising. To compare this relationship in a more 
fully-specified model with the latest income inequality data from the UNU-WIDER 
project, corrected by Professor Solt, across the Western Hemisphere over several time 
periods should be an illuminating exercise for purposes of determining the relationship’s 
stability.  In particular, the quadratic form of democracy and income inequality as 
independent variables explaining each other will be utilized in these preliminary tests. 
DATA 
 The dependent variables for these analyses are derived from the POLITY project 
(for the measure of democracy) and the UNU-WIDER income inequality project as 
corrected by Solt (for the Gini measure of income inequality).  The POLITY project has 
estimated the extent to which a country possesses democratic institutions and procedures 
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on an annual basis since 1800, on a zero (no democracy) to ten (comparatively full 
democracy) and the measure has to be both reliable and valid.  The UNU-WIDER World 
Income Inequality project (2008), from the United Nations University in Helsinki, has 
sought to evaluate the notoriously shaky income inequality data for consistency and has 
compiled consistent measures for roughly 120 countries over the 1950-2007 time period.  
Solt (2009) has endeavored to standardize the UNU-WIDER data for the 1960-2007 time 
period through use of an algorithm to reduce the amount of missing data that are endemic 
to most income inequality research.  I utilize the Solt-corrected version of the UNU-
WIDER income inequality data.  In this analysis, 29 Western Hemispheric countries were 
analyzed over various annual time points in a pooled cross-section time-series, focusing 
on the 1960-2004 time period. 
[TABLE ONE ABOUT HERE] 
The independent variables are standard ones in the income inequality-democracy 
modeling literature.  Gross domestic product per capita is derived from the World Bank.  
Semi-peripheral and peripheral world-system status is derived by Burkhart and Lewis-
Beck (1994) based on theorizing by Frank (1969) and Wallerstein (1974), among others.  
British colonial status is theorized to be connected to both democratization, due to the 
tradition of organized and coherent colonial rule leaving a legacy conducive to 
democratization upon independence (Burkhart 1997) and the relatively greater 
opportunity for voice and eventual more even distribution of resources (Smith 1978).  
Protestantism is theorized to present greater opportunity for individual advancement, 
voice and demand for even distribution (Burkhart 1997, Lipset 1959).  The Protestant 
percentage of population measure comes from Barrett, Kurian and Johnson (2001).  
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Government share of income is likely to be increased in instances of fairer income 
distributions to a widely expansive social safety net (Aalberg 2003).  In a similar vein, 
trade openness has the potential to provide an expansive and enhanced distribution of 
spoils (de Soysa .  Both the government share of income and trade openness measures are 
taken from the World Bank.  Finally, a time-trend independent variable is placed in the 
model to capture any secular movement in inequality. 
MODELS 
 The models to be tested are as follows: 
• Democracy = f (Solt-corrected Gini coefficient, Solt-corrected Gini coefficient2, 
logged GDP/capita, semieripheral world-system status, peripheral world-system 
status, British colonial status, share of population Protestant, government share of 
spending, trade openness, year of observation) 
• Solt-corrected Gini coefficient = f (POLITY democracy score, POLITY 
democracy score2, logged GDP/capita, semieripheral world-system status, 
peripheral world-system status, British colonial status, share of population 
Protestant, government share of spending, trade openness, year of observation) 
The models will be estimated using Stata, version 9.  For maximum accounting of the 
panel heterogeneity and autocorrelation inherent in pooled datasets, the models will be 
estimated using a generalized least squares approach, correcting for both panel 
heteroskedasticity and an AR1 autocorrelation process within the panels.  This 
conservative modeling approach will also reduce the likelihood of Type I errors of 
inference taking place, as statistical significance will be less likely with strong statistical 
controls in place. 
This is an author-produced, peer-reviewed version of this article.  The final, definitive version of this document can be found online at
Conference Papers - American Political Science Association, published by Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. Copyright
restrictions may apply.
8 
 [TABLE TWO ABOUT HERE] 
ANALYSIS 
 The model estimates as presented in Table Two demonstrate, above all, the 
secular trend in income inequality.  The year slope coefficient is positive and statistically 
significant in five of the six panel regressions, indicating an upward trend in income 
inequality over time.  This is true even in the most advanced industrialized countries in 
the dataset, the U.S. and Canada. (Models 1.1 and 2.1 isolate the North American 
countries alone, while Models 1.3 and 2.3 include all countries in the Western 
Hemisphere for which annual data are available across the 1960-2004 time period.)  In 
the U.S., according to the UNU-WIDER data, income inequality climbed by 
approximately 25% during the 1960-2004 time period.  In Canada, income inequality 
increased by 14% during that time period.  Thus, time serves as a fairly powerful and 
consistent control in these multivariate models. 
 Turning to the more substantive independent variables, the results are fairly 
startling for the main variables of interest, POLITY democracy and UNU-WIDER 
inequality.  The linear specification of POLITY has an initial negative effect on 
inequality in North American countries, meaning that increases in democracy lead to 
decreases in the Gini coefficient (and thus of income inequality).  Yet the quadratic 
specification of POLITY is also significant in North American countries, meaning that 
very high levels of democracy are associated with increases in inequality, which is 
counter to theoretical expectations.  This result appears to be driven by U.S. and 
Canadian increases in inequality.  However, the quadratic specification of POLITY is 
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significant and negative in the Caribbean and Latin America, suggesting that substantial 
adavances in democracy result in substantial decreases in inequality.   
Equally important, there is no evidence that either rises or declines in income 
inequality affect democracy in the Western Hemisphere in a causal manner.  Nor is there 
any evidence of an impact of economic development on democratic development in the 
Western Hemisphere as a whole, as the logged GDP per capita variable fails to reach 
statistical significance in Models 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3.  In North America, democratic 
development may well have predated economic development, rather than the other way 
around.  In the Caribbean and Latin America, we may be witness to a similar 
phenomenon.  However, higher levels of economic development do negatively affect the 
Gini coefficient, whether the sample is of North American countries (Model 1.1), 
Caribbean and Latin American countries (Model 1.2), and the Western Hemisphere as a 
whole (Model 1.3).  That is, the wealthier the country, the lower the Gini coefficient.  
This result is well-predicted by Kuznets (1955), among others. 
 Of the other control variables, both a semiperipheral and peripheral world-system 
status increases income inequality in the Caribbean and in Latin America and a 
semiperipheral status decreases democratic performance in the Western Hemispheric 
countries, as predicted by world-system theory.  British colonial status reduces income 
inequality in the Western Hemisphere, while countries with larger Protestant populations 
see significant increases in income inequality in North American and Caribbean countries 
(not surprising due to the relatively larger Protestant populations in the U.S. and Canada 
as well as several former British colonies in the Caribbean), as well as increasing income 
inequality in Latin America (more surprising).  Government spending decreases 
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democracy in the Caribbean and in Latin American countries, which comports well with 
neoclassical economic thought that advocates a state that is relatively free of government 
spending also has a freer polity.   
Finally, trade openness, a common proxy for globalization, appears to reduce 
income inequality in North American countries, which counters North American critics 
of globalization who maintain that the rising tide of global financial integration far from 
equally lifts all North American economic boats.  Yet those critics have more 
ammunition in the Caribbean and Latin American countries, where trade openness yields 
higher income inequality. 
CONCLUSION 
What do these results mean?  The Western Hemisphere appears to be a rich 
mosaic of various stages of democratic development and redistributed income.  North 
America, in particular the U.S. and Canada, seem to have different factors affect their 
rising levels of income inequality over time, in comparison to the Caribbean and Latin 
America.  The performance of the models is strong, though the models explaining income 
distribution have slightly better fit than the models explaining democratic achievement.  
Despite the models' apparent strength, there are several variables missing from these 
models, such as more general international factors as delineated in Huber et al. (2006).  
Yet some basic elements to the explanation in variation in income inequality and 
democracy reveal themselves in these models, even with the secular control of time in 
place as a control variable.  Not surprisingly, the underlying political economy of the 
country has the most consistent independent effect on democratic development and 
income distribution in countries throughout the Western Hemisphere. 
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TABLE ONE: COUNTRIES ANALYZED 
Antigua (c) Argentina (l) Bahamas (c) Barbados (c) 
Belize (l) Bolivia (l) Brazil (l) Canada (n) 
Chile (l) Colombia (l) Costa Rica (l) Cuba (c) 
Dominican Rep. (c) Ecuador (l) El Salvador (l) Guatemala (l) 
Guyana (l) Haiti (c) Honduras (l) Jamaica (c) 
Mexico (n) Nicaragua (c) Panama (c) Paraguay (l) 
Peru (l) Trinidad & Tobago (c) United States (n) Uruguay (l) 
Venezuela (l)    
 
c = Caribbean country 
l = Latin American country 
n = North American country  
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TABLE TWO: INCOME INEQUALITY AND DEMOCRACY  
IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE 
 
Dependent Variable, Models 1.1-1.3 = Income inequality; Models 2.1-2.3 = Democracy 
 
Stata 9, Generalized Least Squares, with correction for both heteroskedastic panels  
and panel-specific AR(1) autocorrelation processes employed 
 
IVs Model 
1.1 
North 
America 
Model 1.2 
Caribbean 
& Latin 
America  
Model 1.3 
Western 
Hemisphere 
Model 
2.1 
North 
America 
Model 2.2 
Caribbean 
& Latin 
America 
Model 2.3 
Western 
Hemisphere 
POLITY -.30 
(6.08) 
.003 
(.38) 
.003 
(.39) 
__ __ __ 
POLITY2 .04 
(2.17) 
-.01 
(3.74) 
-.02 
(4.23) 
__ __ __ 
SoltGini __ __ __ .08 
(.43) 
.03 
(.13) 
-.13 
(1.00) 
SoltGini2 __ __ 
 
__ -.002 
(.51) 
-2.77e-07 
(0.00) 
.001 
(1.00) 
Loggdpcap -11.96 
(3.78) 
-8.57 
(8.45) 
-9.45 
(9.37) 
-.67 
(1.50) 
1.65 
(1.33) 
.85 
(.78) 
Semi __ 2.63 
(3.67) 
8.84 
(4.41) 
-18.37 
(83.17) 
__ -4.30 
(2.38) 
Per __ __ 7.90 
(3.94) 
__ .20 
(.21) 
-3.19 
(1.92) 
Britcolony __ -.47 
(.29) 
-6.77 
(6.02) 
__ 3.23 
(1.99) 
.57 
(.65) 
Protestant .18 
(3.64) 
.30 
(3.33) 
.34 
(5.36) 
-.005 
(.65) 
.06 
(.71) 
.09 
(1.64) 
Govtshare -.008 
(.10) 
.008 
(.52) 
.01 
(.85) 
-.009 
(.59) 
-.08 
(2.79) 
-.01 
(.40) 
Openness -.03 
(3.46) 
.01 
(2.03) 
.01 
(1.96) 
-.006 
(1.79) 
-.003 
(.43) 
.001 
(.24) 
Year .48 
(5.36) 
.21 
(7.20) 
.26 
(8.84) 
.02 
(1.71) 
.21 
(5.57) 
.15 
(4.28) 
Intercept -879.58 
(5.26) 
-341.90 
(6.19) 
-448.94 
(8.08) 
-35.96 
(1.36) 
-426.55 
(5.98) 
-285.58 
(4.42) 
Wald Fit 
Statistic 
102.46, 
p=.00 
120.57, 
p=.00 
329.68, 
p=.00 
9605.4, 
p=.00 
226.73, 
p=.00 
99.75, 
p=.00 
N 102 552 654 102 552 654 
 
Bold results = statistically significant at .05, two-tailed test;  
figures in parentheses = absolute t-ratios. 
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